Intifada: Myths, Realities, and Consequences
The word intifada originates from Arabic, meaning "shaking off" or "uprising."
In recent times, Western university campuses have witnessed a surge in pro-Palestinian protests, with students and faculty chanting slogans such as “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” and calling for “intifada.” While some may interpret intifada as a call for resistance—and to others, it might sound like an exotic new kale salad—its historical reality is far more complex and troubling.
This article sheds light on the intifadas, their historical causes, significance, and devastating consequences. By delving into the ideological foundations that fuel these uprisings—including Islamic teachings and political and economic motivations—we aim to expose the realities that many in the West fail to grasp. Understanding the past is crucial for interpreting present-day calls for intifada and assessing their potential repercussions.
What is an Intifada?
The word intifada originates from Arabic, meaning “shaking off” or “uprising.” In an Islamic and geopolitical context, it has been used to denote violent resistance movements, particularly against Israel. The term has deep ideological roots in Islamic teachings and is linked to broader concepts such as jihad and resistance against perceived oppression.
The Heart of the Conflict
At its core, the Israeli Palestinian conflict is about Israel’s right to exist as the Jewish state. Israel fights to live in peace behind internationally recognized borders, while Palestinian Arab factions—supported by regional backers—struggle to ensure there is no Jewish state at all.
This reality is best captured by the well-known observation often attributed to Israeli diplomat and statesman Abba Eban: “If the Arabs laid down their weapons, there would be peace tomorrow. If Israel laid down its weapons, there would be no Israel.”
This sentiment reflects the existential stakes of the conflict—where Israel seeks security and recognition, while its adversaries, from Hamas to the Palestinian Authority, continue to advocate for its destruction rather than coexistence.
Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam
To fully understand the concept of intifada, one must examine the Islamic doctrine of Dar al-Harb (House of War) and Dar al-Islam (House of Islam). In this worldview, the world is divided into two spheres: lands governed by Islamic law (Dar al-Islam) and those that are not, which are considered in a state of conflict until brought under Islamic rule (Dar al-Harb).
Radical Islamist groups use this framework to justify perpetual conflict, particularly against Israel, which they view as an illegitimate entity occupying Muslim land. The rhetoric of intifada stems from this ideology, portraying Israel as an occupier that must be removed by force.
The First Intifada (1987–1993): A Grassroots Uprising
The First Intifada erupted in December 1987, sparked by a traffic accident in the Gaza Strip in which an Israeli military vehicle collided with a Palestinian car, killing four passengers. While the incident itself was unintentional, it ignited long-standing Palestinian grievances, triggering a widespread uprising.
What began as spontaneous unrest in Gaza quickly spread to the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Unlike previous conflicts, largely orchestrated by established political factions, the First Intifada was driven by grassroots activism. Palestinians engaged in widespread protests, economic boycotts, tax resistance, and violent attacks against Israeli security forces and civilians. In response, Israel imposed curfews, carried out mass arrests, and deployed the military to flashpoint areas. Israeli soldiers faced violent riots, with Molotov cocktails, stones, and other projectiles hurled at them. The IDF’s use of rubber bullets, tear gas, and detention policies drew international scrutiny.
Western media broadcast powerful images of young Palestinians confronting Israeli troops, shaping global perceptions. While many saw the uprising as an expression of Palestinian aspirations for self-determination, others noted the role of regional actors in sustaining hostilities. After nearly six years of unrest, the First Intifada lost momentum, leading to renewed diplomatic efforts. The 1991 Madrid Conference and the 1993 Oslo Accords marked significant steps toward peace, culminating in mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
The Oslo Accords established the Palestinian Authority (PA) and granted it limited self-rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, hopes for lasting peace were soon undermined by continued violence, including Hamas-led suicide bombings in Israeli cities and Israeli countermeasures. The 1995 assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin further destabilised the peace process, while subsequent negotiations—such as the 1998 Wye River Memorandum—attempted but failed to resolve key disputes.
The 2000 Camp David Offer
Tensions continued to rise as Palestinian frustration over Israeli settlement expansion and Israeli security concerns over persistent terrorism created a volatile situation. By the time Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat met at Camp David in July 2000, under the mediation of U.S. President Bill Clinton, the peace process was already fragile.
The summit represented the most comprehensive attempt to resolve the conflict up to that point, yet it ultimately failed, setting the stage for the far more violent Second Intifada. The terms presented to Arafat by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, under U.S. mediation, included:
- West Bank: Palestinian control over 91–94%, with 1–3% land swaps from pre-1967 Israeli territory to compensate for settlement blocs.
- Gaza Strip: Full 100% Palestinian sovereignty.
- East Jerusalem: Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighbourhoods, with some form of shared control over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif.
- Refugees: No full “Right of Return”, but provisions for compensation, resettlement in Palestine, and a limited symbolic return.
- Security Arrangements: Israel would retain a temporary strategic military presence in key areas.
Despite these terms, the Palestinian leadership rejected the proposal and failed to provide any counter offer. The failure of Camp David was followed by the outbreak of the Second Intifada, further deepening the conflict.
The Second Intifada (2000–2005): A Devastating Escalation
The Second Intifada, or Al-Aqsa Intifada, erupted in September 2000. While Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount is often cited as the immediate trigger, this is disingenuous as the roots of the uprising lay in corruption, manipulation, intolerance and an unwillingness to compromise.
In the years leading up to the Second Intifada, diplomatic efforts attempted to bring about a lasting peace. The 1993 Oslo Accords had established the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a governing entity, and by the late 1990s, there was cautious optimism that a two-state solution could be realized. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered substantial concessions, including Palestinian sovereignty over much of the West Bank and Gaza, shared administration of Jerusalem, and even discussions on refugee issues. Yasser Arafat, however, rejected the offer outright—without proposing a counteroffer. His refusal marked a turning point, confirming to many that the Palestinian leadership was more interested in perpetuating conflict than in achieving statehood. Many Palestinians saw the summit’s failure as proof that diplomacy could not deliver their aspirations.
What began as protests quickly escalated into an armed insurgency. Palestinian militants launched an unprecedented campaign of violence, characterized by suicide bombings, sniper attacks, and large-scale terrorist operations targeting Israeli civilians. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and elements within the Palestinian Authority orchestrated attacks in cafes, buses, and shopping centres, murdering men, women, and children in a deliberate campaign of terror. The Palestinian leadership, rather than condemning the violence, encouraged and rewarded it, with the PA paying stipends to the families of “martyrs.”
In response, Israel launched military operations to neutralize terrorist networks. The IDF carried out incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas, targeted senior militants for elimination, and constructed the West Bank security barrier—a defensive measure that significantly reduced terrorist attacks in subsequent years.
The Second Intifada resulted in over 1,000 Israeli deaths and thousands of Palestinian casualties. It shattered any remaining trust between the two sides, leading to the near-total collapse of the peace process. The international community, misled by a narrative of Palestinian victimhood, responded with misplaced sympathy—sending vast amounts of financial aid to the Palestinian authorities, much of which was siphoned off by corrupt officials. Rather than being invested in infrastructure or economic development, these funds were funnelled into the personal accounts of Palestinian leaders, further entrenching their incentive to sustain the conflict rather than resolve it.
President Clinton Reflecting on the Collapse of Camp David
At the New York Times Deal Book Summit in December 2024, former U.S. President Bill Clinton reflected on the 2000 Camp David Summit, a pivotal moment in the Israeli Palestinian peace process. He expressed frustration over the collapse of negotiations, attributing the failure to Yasser Arafat and his refusal to accept a deal that would have established a Palestinian state.
Clinton outlined the far-reaching concessions offered during the talks, including a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, Israeli withdrawal from and a land swap from pre-1967 Israeli territory. Israel also proposed full Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza and a limited but symbolic refugee resettlement arrangement. Despite these terms, Arafat rejected the offer without proposing an alternative, a decision widely seen as a major setback for peace.
Reflecting on the reactions of younger generations, Clinton observed that many young Americans are surprised to learn that Arafat rejected the opportunity for a Palestinian state under favourable conditions. He emphasised that this historical fact often catches them off guard, as they are more familiar with the broader narrative of the conflict than its pivotal moments. His remarks highlighted the crucial role of education in helping younger generations grasp the complexities and missed opportunities that have shaped the present reality.
The Shadow of a Third Intifada (2020–Present)
Between July 2019 and September 2021, I lived in Jerusalem while seconded to the United Nations as a senior officer within an unarmed military peacekeeping mission. During this time, I witnessed a rising wave of violence that often felt like the early stages of a Third Intifada.
Jerusalem experienced a series of violent incidents, heightening tensions in the region. On February 21, 2020, a Palestinian woman attempted to stab passersby at the Armon Hanatziv promenade. Around the same period, a vehicle hit-and-run attack near Jerusalem’s First Station, a popular entertainment district, reinforced the sense of growing instability. These incidents were not isolated; rather, they were part of a broader escalation of violence across Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip.
My role provided me with frequent opportunities to engage in conversations with highly educated Palestinians—both Christian and Muslim Arab professionals—who lived in the West Bank and were bussed into Government House in East Jerusalem, Israel (or, as the UN often referred to it, “no-man’s land”) for their duties. A recurring theme in these discussions stood out to me: a deepening disillusionment with the Palestinian leadership, particularly Mahmoud Abbas.
Many educated Palestinians, including Arab Christians, acknowledged the corruption of their own leaders but saw no alternative to the entrenched status quo. What horrified and shocked me was that they believed the answer was to elect Hamas. Even more striking was how many of these individuals—particularly UN employees—defined the occupation not as Israel’s presence in the West Bank, but as Israel’s very existence. This gave me a stark insight into how radical the region was and how unwilling to compromise the Palestinians were.
Mahmoud Abbas has been a catastrophic failure, yet the alternative—Hamas—is even worse. His prolonged grip on power, now in its 19th year of what was meant to be a four-year term, highlights both the dysfunction of Palestinian governance and the grim reality that, until President Trump’s 2025 White House announcement on resettling Palestinians in neighbouring countries, the only viable political alternative was a terrorist organization that thrives on perpetual conflict.
One of the most significant miscalculations of the Palestinian leadership was Mahmoud Abbas’ outright refusal to engage with the Trump administration’s Peace to Prosperity initiative between 2018 and 2020. While the plan was imperfect, it presented another historic opportunity to redefine Palestinian self-governance through economic incentives and infrastructure investment. Yet, true to form, Abbas rejected it outright, refusing even to negotiate. His actions were part of a long pattern of Palestinian leaders sabotaging their own opportunities—embodying Abba Eban’s famous observation: “The Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.”
At the time, I had only a partial grasp of the deeper forces at play—the staggering influx of Western aid flowing into Palestinian coffers, the systemic corruption that diverted these funds from the people to the ruling elite, and the Palestinian leadership’s perverse incentive to perpetuate conflict rather than pursue peace.
After the horrors of October 7, 2023, this reality is now undeniable.
Follow the Money: Corruption in Palestinian Leadership
Amid the ongoing Israeli Palestinian conflict, rampant financial corruption among Palestinian leaders has severely eroded the credibility of their governance. While ordinary Palestinians endure economic hardship, reports have exposed officials siphoning off aid funds meant for infrastructure and social services, instead amassing personal fortunes at the expense of the very people they claim to represent.
Yasser Arafat, the late leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA), was long suspected of diverting public funds for personal use. In 2003, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that Arafat had transferred approximately $900 million in public funds to accounts under his direct control. These funds, which should have been allocated to improving the lives of Palestinians, instead disappeared into a web of financial secrecy. Following Arafat’s death in 2004, his widow, Suha Arafat, reportedly received €1 million per month from the PA. While ordinary Palestinians struggled with economic instability, she resided in luxurious accommodations in France and Tunisia, far removed from the conditions endured by those still living under PA rule.
Mahmoud Abbas, who succeeded Arafat as President of the Palestinian Authority, has also faced serious allegations of financial misconduct. Despite drawing a modest official salary, his personal net worth is estimated to be around $100 million. His sons, Yasser and Tareq Abbas, have amassed wealth through business dealings that directly benefit from their father’s political influence. Their ventures have included monopolies on American-made cigarettes sold in Palestinian territories, lucrative USAID-funded projects, and exclusive public works contracts. The Abbas family’s accumulation of wealth has further entrenched public perceptions of widespread corruption within the Palestinian political establishment.
Hamas, the Islamist group that has ruled Gaza since 2007, has also fostered a culture of corruption while maintaining the facade of a resistance movement. Khaled Mashal, a former chairman of Hamas’s Political Bureau, has resided in Qatar for years and is estimated to have amassed a personal fortune of approximately $2.6 billion. Mousa Abu Marzouk, another senior Hamas leader, has been implicated in financial dealings that have enriched him significantly, with his net worth estimated at $2.3 billion. While Hamas claims to fight for the Palestinian cause, its leaders enjoy lavish lifestyles abroad, while the people of Gaza suffer from economic deprivation, lack of basic infrastructure, and perpetual cycles of violence.
This entrenched corruption fuels public disillusionment and perpetuates the conflict. Palestinian leaders, instead of working toward a peaceful and prosperous future for their people, have prioritized personal gain. The billions in international aid that pour into Palestinian territories have not translated into economic growth or improved living conditions. Instead, they have reinforced the power of a corrupt elite who have no incentive to end the conflict—because war and victimhood ensure a continued flow of funds.
A Cautionary Conclusion
“Be careful what you wish for; you may receive it.”
The intifada has become a cause célèbre for Western university students, many of whom passionately denounce perceived oppression without a genuine understanding of the conflict’s historical and ideological roots. Their inability to distinguish right from wrong, compounded by a glaring lack of moral clarity, is deeply troubling. What they fail to grasp is that the movements they champion are not driven by freedom or justice but are instead orchestrated by corrupt, self-serving leaders who exploit Palestinian suffering for personal and political gain.
Free speech is fundamental to any free society, but rights should never be divorced from responsibilities. In the West, those who support the intifada generally fall into three categories: Islamists and their sympathizers, who openly or covertly endorse jihadist violence; hard-left zealots and ideologues, who latch onto radical causes as a means of dismantling Western institutions; and useful idiots swept up in the rhetoric. The first group sees the conflict as part of a broader religious and geopolitical struggle, while the second exploits it as yet another front in their war against capitalism, democracy, and Western values. The third, blissfully unaware of the forces they are aligning with, mindlessly parrots slogans and embraces the cause as a fashionable form of activism, oblivious to the dangerous ideologies they are helping to legitimize and spread.
In confronting these threats, the response must be firm and unequivocal. Those who openly support terrorist organizations or incite violence should face serious consequences, including deportation, incarceration, and permanent records that impact future employment prospects. Universities and workplaces must take a stand against ideological extremism masquerading as activism, refusing to provide a platform for those who champion violence under the guise of social justice. A society that tolerates calls for intifada on its streets or campuses without consequence will inevitably find itself fighting the very forces it failed to confront—only at far greater cost.
Colonel Michael Scott CSC is the CEO and Founder of The 2023 Foundation Ltd, a charity focused on combatting antisemitism and fostering peaceful coexistence.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the positions of the Australian Defence Force or the Commonwealth Government of Australia.
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