In the last hostage deal that led to the release of all hostages, what was different for Hamas to agree?
Remember, Hamas agreed to a deal that not only led to the release of all the hostages – including all 20 living hostages on the first day – but also to a deal that ends the war on Israel’s terms and in which Israel controls over half of Gaza until those terms are implemented. According to Trump’s 20-point plan, Hamas is disarmed, its political rule over Gaza is ended, and Gaza is demilitarised. Those are Israel’s terms, which Hamas never accepted before.
What got them to accept it was two things. First, Israel’s decision to conquer Gaza city, which was made in the security cabinet in August and which the IDF began to implement in September. That decision made clear that Israel was prepared to finish the job militarily and eliminate the final Hamas stronghold in Gaza.
The second thing was the American-led diplomatic initiative that completely isolated Hamas, which included lining up not only the Emirates, Saudis, Egyptians and Jordanians but also the Hamas-friendly governments of Qatar and Turkey.
The combination of a massive and imminent Israeli military operation and complete diplomatic isolation led to Hamas agreeing to a deal that resulted in the release of the hostages and ended the war on Israel’s terms.
Now that the last hostage body is out, what do you see happening re Hamas and Gaza? Has Israel achieved its goals? Why or why not?
After the October ceasefire deal, the US advanced its initiative on several fronts. First, it passed a UN Security Council Resolution enshrining Trump’s 20-point plan and creating the Board of Peace. Then the US announced the formation of an executive committee of the board, led by Nickolay Mladenov, who will oversee the Board of Peace’s Gaza policy. They also announced the establishment of a technocratic Palestinian government to manage the day-to-day running of Gaza. This was all part of the American initiative and I think the Trump team deserve a lot of credit for advancing it under difficult circumstances.
The ultimate test will be whether Hamas is disarmed and Gaza is demilitarised.
The US is committed to that goal and Trump has made clear that it will happen. This is critical for any future “day after” plan in Gaza to succeed.
Frankly, most Israelis are pessimistic that this will happen and believe the IDF will have to finish the job. Maybe so. But almost everyone was pessimistic that we would get all the hostages back and we did.
Personally, I think we need to exhaust the possibility of doing the demilitarisation through this US-led diplomatic approach, which will avoid us having to send our soldiers into the rest of Gaza. Of course, for that demilitarisation to succeed, we need to repeat the magic formula that worked in October: A credible, US-backed military threat that Israel will finish the job if it has to, combined with the complete diplomatic isolation of Hamas, including Turkey and Qatar.
The US recently said it will focus the next 100 days on this and we need to work very closely with them on that. If they succeed, all of Israel’s war aims will be achieved by diplomatic means. If they don’t succeed, Israel will have to finish the job itself – which will entail achieving our war aims through military means.
Either way, Israel is well positioned to achieve all the goals we set out to achieve on October 7. And now thankfully we are in that position with all the hostages home.
How have the Abraham Accords been affected by the war?
The Abraham Accords have been resilient despite the scale and length of the war. The Emirates, the first signatory of those accords, surprised me with the depth of their commitment to the partnership with Israel. It would have been easy for them to take a step back, especially since the Abraham Accords were signed only three years before the war. But they didn’t.
Their national airlines were the only ones besides El Al not to stop service during the war, they never withdrew their ambassador, and they doubled down on their relations with Israel in many fields.
Everyone who is supportive of Israel should be very grateful for how the UAE stood with us during the war. They proved to be strategic partners not fair-weather friends – and I am confident that you will see a dramatic upgrade in our partnership with them in the years ahead.
At the same time, because of the trust the UAE engendered in Israel, they also played a key role in helping address a lot of humanitarian issues in Gaza. In fact, the UAE may have done more to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza for the Palestinians than the entire Arab world combined. Their commitment to the Abraham Accords proved a blessing to both Israel and the Palestinians.
One other point – the Abraham Accords – and in particular Israel’s move into US-led CENTCOM, which includes the Arab states and which happened in the wake of the accords – helped Israel defend itself against Iranian rockets and drones in April 2024 and October 2024, setting the stage for the successful 12-day war last June.
Is Saudi-Israeli normalisation still achievable in the foreseeable future? What would make it politically viable for both sides?
It is definitely achievable. We believe one of the motivating factors for October 7 was to scuttle the expansion of the Abraham Accords. That is why victory in the October 7 war is not only to defeat Hamas militarily and politically. It is also to continue on the path we were on before October 7th by expanding the Abraham Accords.
As for the conditions, those conditions have changed over time. What the Saudis are asking for now they did not ask for in Trump’s first term. What the Saudis may ask for in the future may be different than they are asking for today.
And speaking about those conditions in the press will only be counterproductive. This may surprise you but 24 hours before the agreement with the UAE, only three or four Israelis knew about it. That small circle is why we succeeded.
To get a peace with Saudi Arabia, we need to engage quietly behind the scenes and forge the breakthrough.
I am confident that it will happen during Trump’s second term – hopefully sooner rather than later.
What are the realistic prospects of regime change in Iran? Do you think Trump will strike? If the Islamic regime remains, what does this mean for the nuclear threat?
There is a lot to unpack there. I believe the regime’s days are numbered but I can’t tell you whether that number is five days, 50 days or 500 days.
After the 12-day war in June, I believed that Iran’s regime would not survive the rest of Trump’s term in office. Frankly, things are moving even faster than I thought they would.
Iran was weakened dramatically by what Israel did after October 7. The octopus arms of its proxies have become T-rex arms. Its military nuclear capability was largely destroyed. Iran is largely left with a stockpile of enriched uranium buried deep underground, and President Trump has said that he will strike Iran again if it tries to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. Israel also dramatically set back Iran’s missile program.
But the Iranian regime’s greatest vulnerability has always been the Iranian people, who hate it. When Iran’s people protested the regime in 2009, they had no support from President Obama. When they protested in 2022, they had no support from President Biden. When they came into the streets last month, they received support – at least, rhetorically – from President Trump. That is new. Trump has backed them powerfully with words. Now the question is whether those words will be backed by action.
Trump has moved American military resources into the theatre and is preparing for all options – telling the regime that he intends to achieve his objective the easy way or the hard way. They can negotiate to give up their nuclear enrichment program, ship out their enriched uranium stockpiles, end their support for terror proxies and limit their missile program or they can face the consequences.
I don’t know what Iran will choose but I think the President is dead serious about putting the Iran threat behind him once and for all.
How would the return of the Shah affect not just Israel–Iran relations but Israel’s relations with the wider Middle East, including Abraham Accords countries, given the Iranian threat was a major factor that brought them together?
Good question. I think the new regime in Iran, whether ultimately run by the son of the former Shah, or someone else, will be a friend of Israel. In fact, when the regime goes down, Iran will rush into an alliance with both Israel and America.
As for our relations with the Arab states, the glue of having an Iranian common enemy would indeed dissolve. But there are many other reasons for them to partner with Israel. We have other common enemies with Arab regimes that embrace modernity, and partnering with Israel will be a big economic boon for these countries.
In any case, if we face the challenge of normalising with the Arab states because of the fall of Iran’s radical regime, that is a challenge I would happily accept because it would mean that a regime that has been calling and working for Israel’s destruction for nearly half a century is in the dustbin of history where it belongs.
What’s the future for the Israel–US relationship after Trump? Is Israel in danger of becoming a partisan issue in American politics?
Big topic. Believe it or not, I believe Israel will be the most important ally of the US in the 21st century since interests is what drive states together and American security and technology interests are pushing the US and Israel closer and closer together.
True, there are many loud voices who are trying to drive a wedge between Israel and the US, but Israel matters to American interests in a much more profound way than it did a generation or two ago. That will become even more true in the years and decades ahead.
As for Israel becoming a partisan issue in the US, contrary to what many believe, that has been true for more than a quarter of a century in terms of support for Israel among Democratic and Republican voters. While some think this is primarily a function of policy differences between particular US and Israeli governments, the empirical data shows that the impact of policy differences on overall support for Israel is much smaller than people think.
The real driving force behind attitudes towards Israel in the American body politic is internal ideological and demographic changes in the United States – something which you have seen in many European countries as well over the last two generations.
Despite being an increasingly partisan issue because of these internal shifts, Israel has rightly worked hard over the years to strengthen support on both sides of the aisle. For example, the last MOU on military assistance was forged with the Obama administration at the end of his presidency despite serious differences over Iran and the Palestinian issue. Israel must and will continue to work hard on this. But the best thing we can do to maintain support for Israel in America and elsewhere is to continue to build up our national power. People forge alliances with the strong not the weak.
You’re here for UIA – tell me about the importance of its work in Israel, from your perspective?
We in Israel like to talk about the disproportionate impact we have on the world – how we punch well above our weight. That is certainly true of Australian Jews as well. The Jewish community there has a well-deserved reputation as being perhaps the most Zionistic Jewish community in the world.
Just look at the UIA-Keren Hayesod. Not only did a great Aussie, Steven Lowy, lead global Keren Hayesod for many years but the campaigns for Australia have been the strongest per capita campaigns in the world year after year. What was true before October 7 has become even more true since – with the Australian community raising more than $US25 million [$35 million] for Israel in 2025. That support went to many vital causes – a victims of terror fund, rebuilding the south and north of Israel, helping aliyah, youth at risk, Israeli society resilience, mental trauma, local municipalities, bomb shelters and much, much more.
This support occurred even as the Australian Jewish community faced growing local needs, especially in security, which have only become more acute since the Bondi attack. I look forward to my first ever visit to Australia later this month not only to stand in solidarity with a remarkable Jewish community after it suffered a horrific terror attack but also to discuss what Israel and Australian Jewry can do together to secure the Jewish future.
Ron Dermer will headline UIA’s event in NSW on Sunday, February 22, in Victoria on Wednesday, February 25, and WA on Thursday, February 26. Bookings: uiaaustralia.org.au
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