WCK strike: What the record actually shows

The death of aid worker Zomi Frankcom was a terrible tragedy. Our hearts go out to her family and friends for this loss. There is no doubt that she was working in Gaza out of the best of motivations and it was brave of her to willingly serve in a very dangerous war zone. The world can ill afford to lose such people.

There is a shared responsibility for her death. There are the operational mistakes and failed targeting process of the IDF, freely admitted by them and for which they have apologised. Zomi was also let down by the exceptionally poor operational standards of the World Central Kitchen, particularly when compared with the experienced and proven standards adhered to by organisations like the ICRC.

The person assigned to investigate and report on the WCK incident on behalf of the Australian government, with the full cooperation of the IDF, was former CDF Mark Binskin. Binskin has a wealth of high level operational and targeting experience in Iraq, during the initial large scale conventional maneuver operations, and then later in the highly relevant siege of Mosul from October 2016-July 2017, in which the RAAF was closely involved.

His report disclosed that the WCK hired armed guards, which was not cleared with the IDF and which it would not have agreed to. The WCK vehicles were using a route that was different to the one communicated to the IDF. The movement was conducted at night rather than in daylight, which was also contrary to what had been advised to the IDF. One of the WCK guards was observed by the IDF firing into the air. These factors led to the IDF conclusion that the convoy had been hijacked by Hamas.

The WCK vehicles did not carry transponders and radios and were inadequately marked, all in contrast with the ICRC which is an organisation well practiced in working in war zones. The lack of radios was particularly problematic in this instance: the IDF had no way of tactically communicating with WCK. That is inexcusable.