Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was no Pope

The Iranian community in Australia and abroad have reacted with deep concern to claims presented before the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion by Dr Ali Alsamail, that portrayed Ali Khamenei as merely a religious figure comparable to the Pope and inferred that he had no structural connection to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The Iranian diaspora community seeks to ensure that these demonstrably inaccurate claims do not remain unchallenged in the official record of one of Australia’s most consequential inquiries, following the most devastating terrorist attack in Australia’s modern history.

This is not a personal disagreement with a witness. It is a matter of factual accuracy, institutional integrity and national security. Misrepresenting the ideological and command structure of the Islamic Republic risks distorting the Commission’s understanding of the regime, the IRGC and the threat they pose within Australia and abroad.

The constitutional framework of the Islamic Republic explicitly outlines the role of the Supreme Leader. Article 5 of the constitution provides that, during the occultation of the “Mahdi” (Twelfth Imam), all political and religious authority is vested in the Supreme Leader, entrusted in leading the global “Islamic Revolution”:

“During the Occultation of the Wali al-Asr [Mahdi], the wilayah and leadership of the Ummah devolve upon the just [the Supreme Leader] faqih, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability, will assume the responsibilities of this office…”

This articulation reflects the integration of ideological and governance structures within the Islamic Republic, as well as the clear political role of the former Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, shaping both its internal governance and external posture.

The role of the IRGC has also been made explicit, in advancing its ideological mission. The preamble to the Constitution asserts:

“In the formation and equipping of the country’s defence forces, due attention must be paid to faith and ideology as the basic criteria. Accordingly, the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps are to be organised in conformity with this goal, and they will be responsible not only for guarding and preserving the frontiers of the country, but also for fulfilling the ideological mission of Jihad in God’s way; that is, expanding the sovereignty of God’s law throughout the world… “.

This is in accordance with the Qur’anic verse: “Prepare against them whatever force you are able to muster, and steeds of war, striking fear into the enemy of Allah and your enemy, and others beyond them” [Surah 8:60].”

The title “Supreme Leader” was neither ceremonial nor purely religious. Article 110 of the Constitution states that Khamenei was فرمانده کل قوا, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The regular army, the IRGC and all paramilitary Islamist proxy armed forces were subject to his ultimate authority. He also possessed the constitutional authority to declare war and peace, mobilise the armed forces and resolve disputes between the different branches of the armed forces. Khamenei did not need to hold a formal position within the IRGC because he stood above it as its highest constitutional authority. To claim that he had no connection to the IRGC is therefore not a matter of interpretation. It contradicts the Islamic Republic’s very own constitution.

His authority was expressed both institutionally and symbolically. He was known for delivering Friday prayer sermons with a rifle beside him or in his hands, presenting himself not merely as a cleric but as the political and military leader of the Islamic Republic. He also used Friday and Eid al-Fitr sermons to communicate the regime’s political, military and strategic positions.

Comparing Khamenei’s position to the Pope does not merely simplify his role. It fundamentally whitewashes the nature and extraordinary extent of the power he exercised. In the Australian context, this has been associated with the development of networks and forms of influence beyond Iran’s borders, including the potential for increased targeted hostility toward specific communities, namely Jewish and Iranian Australians – something blatantly omitted by Dr Alsamail. If Dr Alsamail, and the likes of whom, seek to invoke a sense of reverence for a spiritual leader of the Shia Islamic faith, they would – like many apolitical Shia Muslims – instead choose to nominate a representative such as Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani, who rejects direct clerical rule and acts more as a moral authority, generally outside of political matters.

Dr Alsamail is entitled to his own interpretation of Ali Khamenei, but the characterisation of Khamenei as merely a religious figure, with no meaningful connection to the IRGC, is not merely inextricably false, but rather incompatible with the very constitutional and institutional reality of the Islamic Republic regime.

Equally concerning is the Commission’s lack of critical scrutiny of this claim and of the broader evidence concerning the Islamic Republic’s ideological influence and networks within Australia. The Iranian community has made a substantial contribution to the Royal Commission in submissions addressing these issues, yet the wider Iranian-Australian community has received comparatively little representation in the inquiry.

If the Royal Commission is to succeed in identifying and combating the forces behind the rise of antisemitism and erosion of social cohesion in Australia, it must recognise the role of transnational ideological subversion, particularly that emanating from the Islamic Republic regime, and subject those who represent communities affiliated with its governing institutions, including those who legitimise figures such as former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, to appropriate and rigorous scrutiny.

Bibi Soleimani and Ali Beikzadeh are Iranian-Australian human rights activists.