Failing to grasp the severity of the threat
Reading through While Israel Slept, and the blow-by-blow account of how many soldiers were killed and how Israel missed the impending massacre, is a harrowing experience.
When Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot, two of Israel’s premier political journalists, set out to write a book a few months before October 7, they had no idea that both their world and their book were about to dramatically change.
What emerged was While Israel Slept, part history of Hamas and part retelling of the decisions made by successive Israeli governments over decades that led to the catastrophe and slaughter of 1200 people on October 7, as well as the kidnapping of 250 more.
Katz and Bohbot open the book with a meticulous retelling of the morning of October 7 from the vantage point of the tzatzpaniyot, the observers stationed at Nahal Oz military base. At 6.29am on October 7, 2023, their final moments are recorded before the base was overrun, where more than 50 soldiers were killed, and 10 soldiers were kidnapped, including seven tzatzpaniyot.
“Then, moments later, Roni Eshel uttered the dreaded code phrase, an IDF term for their worst nightmare: ‘Turkish horsemen,’ signalling a border infiltration. ‘One has crossed the fence and is armed,’ Eshel said more urgently. ‘Confirm receipt!'”
It is a harrowing reconstruction of one of the worst hit bases, meticulously pieced together so the reader feels the fear, uncertainty and dread that the soldiers on the base, just a few hundred meters from Gaza, felt that morning before their deaths at the hands of the people they were reporting on.
The book chronicles how decades of Israeli government policy fundamentally misunderstood Hamas’s intentions, believing that Qatari cash and increased work permits for Gazan workers would result in quiet being met with quiet from the Strip.
“Yossi Cohen, Netanyahu’s national security adviser was sent to Doha to make the pitch to the regime [after 2014]: increase your investment in Gaza and help the Palestinians build infrastructure and in exchange assist Israel in achieving quiet.”
The Qataris agreed and from then on would send $30 million in cash every month to Gaza, the vast majority in cash.
While Israel knew that some of these funds would end up in the hands of Hamas, the book describes how Israeli leaders still believed this would bring quiet.
“Officials now admit that … they were naive to think they could control the destination of cash being transferred into Gaza and that, in reality, it was impossible to know if and what portion of those funds reached Hamas’s military wing.
“After October 7, Israeli defence officials speculated that the amount must have been substantial, even though the terrorist wing did have separate funding channels, including additional funds from Qatar.”
In addition, while Israel was in possession of documents indicating Hamas’s military build-up, including information about vast stockpiles of rockets, GPS jammers, drones and remote-controlled underwater vehicles, as well as an extensive naval capability, the warnings were not acted upon.
As the book notes, “In the years that followed [the 2014 war], the IDF’s misjudgements became painfully clear. One of the strongest countries in the Middle East, with one of the world’s most sophisticated intelligence services, Israel had ignored the black and white intelligence that warned of the coming war.”
The authors also explore the Hebrew term “conceptzia”, the prevailing assumption within Israel’s security establishment that shaped how intelligence it received about Gaza was interpreted.
In the lead up to October 7, 2023, Israeli intelligence assessed that the group was no longer interested in war.
“Beyond the blows the IDF thought it had inflicted upon Hamas, what contributed to this assessment was how the terrorist group had decided to sit out one of the more recent operations in Gaza, Operation Black Belt in November 2019, which the IDF had launched exclusively against Islamic Jihad … this led [Israeli] intelligence analysts to believe that Hamas was calculated in its priorities. It wanted economic prosperity and stability, not war.”
Reading through While Israel Slept, and the blow-by-blow account of how many soldiers were killed and how Israel missed the impending massacre, is a harrowing experience.
Katz and Bohbot deftly describe the military and intelligence apparatus that failed to grasp the severity of a threat that had been clearly spelled out for years. The consequences of ignoring this information were devastating, with hundreds of civilians murdered, and the attack triggering a war that would go on to devastate much of Gaza.
While the book ends with suggestions from both journalists about how Israel might avoid a repeat of October 7 and what actions it can take now to prevent the same situation emerging again, in the current climate, with Israel at war with Iran, and Gaza still partially controlled by Hamas, it remains a sobering read.
While Israel Slept: How Hamas Surprised the Most Powerful Military in the Middle East is published by Pan Macmillan Australia, $51.99
To watch The AJN interview with Yaakov Katz, visit our YouTube channel, youtube.com/watch?v=43SHGHQrYxo