Global unity behind 21-point US–Israel peace plan

The international community should unite in welcoming the announcement of agreement between the US and Israel on a 21 point plan to bring an immediate halt to the war, release of the hostages, demilitarisation and deradicalization of the Palestinian territories, systematic reform of the Palestinian Authority (PA), an international stabilisation force and temporary administration of Gaza.

In particular the fundamental start point of the total removal of Hamas from Gaza and the exclusion of any role for the organisation in Palestinian affairs should be embraced by all.

The 21Points are markedly superior to the New York Declaration, which was extensively polluted by rhetoric and propaganda, more intent on demonising and delegitimising Israel than on practical steps to peace.
Signs also appear hopeful that an agreement can be secured, which at least in the near term will free the hostages. Israel has demonstrated its intent with an act of good faith in halting offensive operations. It remains to be seen whether Hamas can be trusted to reciprocate.

For those who genuinely care about the Palestinian people and the two-state solution there should be nothing but full throated support for the intent to establish a rigorous path to a sustainable and efficacious Palestinian state.

Of particular note is the endorsement of this plan by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE, Indonesia, Pakistan, Türkiye, Qatar and Egypt. Even Emmanuel Macron, whose moral compass has been disoriented in recent times, has come on board.

There should be an equal consensus built around the need for a united international effort to neutralise the insidious and evil influence of Iran in the region, including its initiation of terror and wars of aggression and the promotion of genocide against the State of Israel. We should work actively to apply pressure for regime change to free the Iranian people.

There is real merit in establishing an international authority that will simultaneously tackle the immediate relief and reconstruction needs in Gaza and at the same time work with Palestinian technocrats to steadily build Palestinian competency and reliability. This must be accompanied by a major focus on eliminating the corruption that has undermined the standing amongst Palestinians and the effectiveness of all previous Palestinian administrations.

There have been notable examples of such efforts in the context of failed or transitioning states. One close to home for Australians is Timor Leste, which was subject to the UNTAET mission from 1999 to 2002 under Ian Martin and Sergio Vieira de Mello. The mission suffered from the weaknesses of the UN system in papering over a flawed approach to issues such as the security sector and ensuring social divisions were being addressed.

This led to the melt down of 2006 which required another Australian led mission in Operation Astute that was required to establish public order measures, help address grievances and manage political accommodations. There were similarities to the situation in Gaza the following year where Hamas fought a civil war against Fatah killing 600 Palestinians, resulting in 18 years of tyranny and violence.

Timor Leste in contrast has since become a stable democracy on the basis of a more comprehensive approach that was taken to ensure the conditions of stability. These lessons must be learned if the international effort in the Palestinian territories is to be successful. The Palestinian territories will of course present a more complicated threat environment with a toxic mix of Islamist extremism, tribal rivalry, crime, external meddling and arms.
There will need to be extremely close cooperation between the stabilisation force and Israeli security. The phased transition of sectors in Gaza is a wise approach and the maintenance of a security buffer for the foreseeable future is absolutely essential to give Israel and its people the confidence to go along with the process. Amongst the predominantly Muslim contingents to an international stabilisation force there will be those who are vulnerable to recruitment by Hamas to aid their terror objectives. This will require a rigorous system of vetting and monitoring.

To enable Gazans to be free of intimidation from Hamas and motivated to support peace building with Israel there will need to be a peace dividend for them. This can come with the reconstruction effort but ensuring a safe space for them to provide information against Hamas operatives and to put themselves forward to fill administrative roles, will be essential.

A key incentive for Israel will be a demonstrated embrace by surrounding Arab nations that is fully committed to. This will need to be through real links and combined endeavours for regional prosperity that is accompanied by an acceptance of the diversity that has been in severe decline across the Middle East and much of North Africa, involving not only the persecution and flight of Jews but other minorities such as Christians, Druze and Bahai.
Egypt can play a key role here in establishing a border with Gaza that opens up potential economic development. Egypt could rebuild the other half of the city of Rafah that it flattened and establish an economic cooperation zone with the PA that Gazans can fully participate in and benefit from.

In building the governance capacity of the Palestinians a concept could be adopted that was experimented with in Iraq, but not effectively implemented, following the 2003 war. Each Department of government could be subjected to a process of “graduation”. That is, a clear set of Key Performance Indicators and standards should be established against which Palestinian capacity would be assessed. Once a department had consistently met these goals then it could graduate to self-administration. Further building on what was attempted in Iraq an independent Inspector General’s Agency (IG) should be established with overriding powers of investigation. This would originally be led by an international appointee until a satisfactory moment for transition. In every administrative department of the PA there would be an outlier office of the IG, subject only to the authority of the IG and reporting directly to his agency. This embedded office would monitor the daily activities of the department utilising the latest transaction monitoring technology provided by the international community. This monitoring system would remain accessible to the transition authority until independence.

To be clear this plan will need to be implemented in accordance with some basic principles. This would include the need for the abandonment of the so-called “right of return” on the Palestinian side and an acceptance of territorial compromise. On the Israeli side it will be essential for there to be a National Unity Government on the process so that extreme elements can be marginalised and critical decisions adopted. In the West Bank settler outposts beyond the territorial compromise will need to be dismantled or remaining settlers prepared to be part of a Palestinian State. The Israeli government in the meantime will need to effectively police settler violence along with neutralising Hamas terror cells.

The way ahead is strewn with fraught issues and challenges. If the international community is fixed in its intent, resources and follow through, bringing the same degree of pressure to the Palestinian leadership as it has to Israel, then it has a chance to succeed.