Iran’s terror threat to Australia has not diminished

Iran has generated a sophisticated eco-system of terrorism. That’s the sober message delivered by ASIO chief Mike Burgess in his candid annual threat assessment speech delivered recently at ASIO’s headquarters in Canberra. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has emerged as one of the most influential instruments of Iranian state power beyond the Middle East. Iran has been battered by the impacts of the US-Israel war. But Burgess believes that Iran’s interest in carrying out acts of terrorism in Australia hasn’t diminished.

Burgess took his audience through Iran’s recent proxy arson campaign against Jewish targets here. The attacks against Jewish communities were perpetrated by criminals directed by the IRGC. An Iran-based Australian citizen who orchestrated the firebombing of the Lewis Continental Kitchen in Bondi was a senior agent of the IRGC Quds Force, running its networks around the world.

A former Australian resident living in Iraq directed the attack on the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne. Iran recruited him through Iraqi-based militia groups. Burgess observed that the Iranian department he worked for was named Department eleven thousand, the covert international intelligence and operations unit within the Quds Force.

The Albanese government deserves praise when last November it prescribed the IRGC as a state sponsor of terrorism. It will be important we maintain the IRGC’s terrorist designation, like Al Qaeda and ISIS. We expelled the Iranian ambassador and three of his staff last August. But we haven’t withdrawn Iranian diplomatic privileges: the Iran embassy still operates with staff in Canberra. There’s a huge irony: the Albanese government has moved to shut down the Afghan embassy in Canberra, which represents voices of moderation, while leaving open the embassy of Iran, a state that actively supports the Taliban.

In this context it’s noteworthy that shadow education minister Julian Leeser recently pointed out that he represents the third largest Persian community in the country. They informed the shadow minister that their community feared the activities of the embassy and the IRGC in this country. Leeser wants the embassy shut outright.

In his speech Burgess highlighted how earlier this year an Iran-aligned group had orchestrated a wave of attacks across Europe that mostly targeted Jewish interests. He didn’t name the group. But he would have been referring to Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia, roughly translated as “the Islamic movement of the companions of the righteous”. Since 2018 the IRGC has been linked to at least eleven attempted or partially executed attacks on European soil, primarily targeting Iranian dissidents, Jewish communities, and Israeli embassies. In Europe, as well as here, Iran has relied on criminal intermediaries to maintain plausible deniability. Tehran understands the effectiveness of disposable operatives.

Burgess noted that there’s a realistic possibility the Iran-aligned group active in Europe will expand its operations to this part of the world. And in a chilling warning he stated that Iran could conduct assassinations on Australian soil. Burgess said that ASIO had conducted numerous warranted activities targeting Australians in direct contact with the IRGC. ASIO assessed these individuals were seeking to foster antisemitism and encourage violence against Iran’s perceived enemies. Iran has its back against the wall, so the risk of state sponsorship of terror could increase. Australia should now be urging the US to make any final peace agreement with Iran conditional on severe consequences for Iranian terror abroad.

In the future we should expect terrorist versions of “Airtasker”. A terror job will be offered for money by bodies like the IRGC. Iran has demonstrated its ability to combine covert violence and the deployment of criminal intermediaries into a single operational approach. Iran will continue to operate in a way where hostile actions are conducted without clear attribution. This will remain a challenge for our law enforcement agencies that are focused on identifiable perpetrators.

Iran is also interested in soft power as well as coercion. One insidious means is TikTok, a tool effectively controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. Young Australians are increasingly shifting away from traditional news sources and relying on social media like Tiktok as their primary source. With the close alignment of self interest between Iran and China TikTok builds into its algorithm anti-Israel and antisemitic incitement. Teens have gone from two per cent of ASIO’s counter-terrorism investigations to fifteen per cent. Our security agencies will need to monitor how Iran uses social media to spread its antisemitic messages.

Burgess pointed out in his speech that ASIO isn’t just facing rising terror risks, but foreign governments are also pursuing interference in Australia at “extreme levels”. Before wars are fought on battlefields, they are almost always fought in information spaces first. Disinformation shapes perceptions and behaviour. Iran has a clear track record of attempting to exploit social divisions.

Iran’s capacity to project power regionally has been greatly weakened because of the war. We can therefore expect to see it conduct more foreign interference operations. It’s a first order strategic threat. The more people are warned about disinformation tactics the less likely it is that the public will be manipulated by malign actors like Iran.

Dr Anthony Bergin is an expert associate at the National Security College.