Israel’s election and what comes after

One recurring theme of the Royal Commission on Antisemitism and Social Cohesion has been Virginia Bell’s interrogation of a fundamental question: is antizionism a form of antisemitism?

At its core, Zionism is the right of the Jewish people to determine their own future. History has shown the consequences when that right is denied.

The vehicle for this is the Jewish state, in the Jewish people’s ancestral homeland – a land in which Jews are indigenous and have maintained an unbroken presence.

Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought or accepted a two-state solution. Palestinian leaders, however, have yet to accept any resolution that recognises the permanent legitimacy of a Jewish-majority state, whatever its borders.

Support for a genuine two-state solution, however unrealistic it currently seems, is neither antizionist nor antisemitic. Support for a binational or single state, intended to end Jewish self-determination, is both.

Zionism was never only about establishing a Jewish state. Zionism is also about what kind of state Israel should be and what relationship it should have with the Jewish Diaspora.

In one sense, Israel’s election on October 27 will be about precisely these questions: what kind of country do Israelis want? Yet the debate will not follow the traditional divisions between Zionist ideological movements.

That drift will become even clearer after the election. Once it is known which parties have crossed the 3.25 per cent Knesset threshold, they will have to decide whether joining a government matters more than adhering rigidly to party doctrine. Coalition arithmetic will almost certainly overwhelm most ideological concerns.

Traditional Zionist movements have receded. Practical questions of security, demography, governance and national responsibility have moved to the foreground.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu remains the dominant factor – both for and against – on election day and during the coalition negotiations that will follow. He is the lightning rod for every argument about policy, leadership and style.

Among both his defenders and detractors, shades of grey have largely disappeared. The election may still be two months away, but the rhetoric is already intense and increasingly dangerous.

On security, there has been a significant shift across the political spectrum, away from merely assessing an enemy’s intentions and towards preventing that enemy from acquiring dangerous capabilities.

Relinquishing territory in return for unenforceable or unreliable promises is unlikely to be an election winner, whatever the external pressure. Israelis feel they have been mugged by experience too many times. The wild and very wide celebrations of the rape and murder and atrocities of October 7 have left an indelible mark.

In the struggle between the High Court and the Knesset, there is a widespread view that the pendulum has swung too far towards the court and should move back, but not as far as the government previously attempted to push it.

Sharing the national burden is another major issue. Parties are proposing many ways to address it, but implementing a workable plan is much harder. Any coalition agreement will probably address the issue, at least in principle.

For now, the parties are saying more about whom they will not join, than whom they will.

That includes Ra’am, the Israeli Arab party whose support helped propel Naftali Bennett into the prime minister’s office in 2021. If no majority coalition emerges, Ra’am leader Mansour Abbas may again be courted, either to join a government, or support a minority government from outside it.

The great unknown is how the US confrontation with Iran develops, and what the situation will be in Gaza and Lebanon.

In a significant tactical shift, the US has announced plans for the “economic asphyxiation” of Iran. If effectively implemented, this could cripple the Iranian leadership, sharply reduce its capacity to fund Hamas and Hezbollah, and potentially contribute to regime change.

At the same time, a new alignment is emerging between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

Together, these developments highlight a central problem; Israel’s military achievements have not yet been converted into strategic gains. That, too, will be an election issue.

October 7 and everything that followed have also generated conflicting forces.

In its isolation, Israel has rediscovered the Diaspora. At the same time, both Israelis and Diaspora Jews have realised that they are all in this together, whether they like it or not. Counterintuitively however, growing numbers on the Jewish left are increasingly distancing themselves from Israel.

Zionism has always affirmed Israel’s central place in Jewish life. What is now emerging is a broader and more consequential question of what role Israel should play, if any, in sustaining Jewish life throughout the Diaspora.

This shift has been developing for two decades. Now, October 7 and its aftermath have accelerated it dramatically, turning an evolving debate into what is really a radical reappraisal of Zionist thought.

It is not nearly yet a core issue in Israeli elections. Nevertheless, it is moving somewhat onto the national agenda, and Israeli political leaders across the spectrum are speaking about it with increasing frequency.

For much of Zionism’s history, significant parts of the movement dismissed Diaspora existence as illegitimate, temporary, or destined to disappear.

Today, by contrast, Israeli leaders increasingly recognise a responsibility for Jewish continuity, wherever Jews live.

The urgent challenge is to determine how this relationship can be organised. There are too few Jews in the world for us to ignore, postpone, or mishandle this fundamental responsibility. Am Yisrael chai.

Dr Ron Weiser AM is an Executive Life Member of the Zionist Federation of Australia and Life Governor of the Zionist Council of NSW, and co-chair of the Jewish Agency’s Taskforce on Antisemitism.