The importance of next week’s poll
Israelis will be voting on building a new version of Israel as a democracy and a Jewish state.
Hovering above the ideological differences, personalities and sloganeering in the lead-up to the October 27 Israeli elections has been the dark cloud of October 7. Parties and candidates debate numerous heavy questions arising from that dark Shabbat three years ago – who should be held accountable for what happened? How should October 7 be investigated? Who should lead the Jewish state out of the dire straits of being widely accused of genocide and war crimes and targeted with sanctions? And what would a plan to start healing a deeply wounded and traumatised nation look like?
Many commentators present the election as a referendum on the leadership of Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu, Israel’s longest-serving Prime Minister, who led the country during the October 7 terror attack and through the subsequent wars in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran. Pollsters typically divide the political map into the Netanyahu bloc – Likud, the religious and extreme right, and the ultra-Orthodox – and the ABBA (Anyone But Bibi Again) bloc, four diverse parties – right-wing, centrist and left-wing – who seek to replace him, without necessarily agreeing who should take his place.
But this division oversimplifies deeper questions at the heart of the 2026 election campaign. Above all, Israelis will be voting on building a new version of Israel as a democracy and a Jewish state.
First, democracy. Prior to October 7, Israel was divided like never before on the Netanyahu government’s controversial judicial overhaul plan. Proponents of the reforms, which sought to increase the power of the Knesset and government vis-à-vis the judicial system, considered it a necessary step to weaken the “old elites” – the mostly secular establishment aligned with the centre and left – who allegedly hold a perpetual majority on Israel’s Supreme Court. Opponents warned it would undermine democracy by removing almost all judicial oversight of government decisions. Hundreds of thousands on both sides angrily protested in Israel’s major cities for months, many waving the national flag as if to say: “our side is the real Israel”. Tensions nearly reached boiling point.
Then came October 7 – an event that severely damaged the fundamental contract between the state and its citizens: loyalty, taxes and military service in exchange for security, stability and care for the future. When Hamas terrorists invaded the communities near Gaza, massacring, raping, kidnapping, and destroying, Israeli citizens were left unprotected and at their mercy for hours.
Second, Israel as a Jewish state. Since October 7, years of war on several fronts have proven that a bigger, stronger and more costly IDF is badly needed. Facing this new reality, most Israelis can no longer tolerate the exemption from army service given to tens of thousands of ultra-Orthodox men. In the early years of the state, a few hundred men were allowed to study Torah instead of serving in the IDF to preserve Jewish learning after the Shoah. That arrangement has grown much harder to sustain with the increased numbers and political power of the ultra-Orthodox. Demographers predict that the ultra-Orthodox could make up a third of all Israelis by 2050.
Now, from the tensions and divisions of the judicial overhaul issue and the trauma of October 7 emerges an opportunity for a restart: including strengthening Israel’s democracy by defining the relationship between the judiciary and government, and rewriting the social contract between Israelis and their state.
The next governing coalition will be tasked with rebuilding a wounded nation’s trust in state institutions and also upgrading the IDF to provide reliable safety and security to Israelis. A crucial step must surely be an honest, extensive investigation into all aspects of the colossal October 7 failures – political, military, operational.
Drafting the ultra-Orthodox into the army should be another urgent mission. This would also lead to increased interaction between the ultra-Orthodox and the rest of Israel’s society – secular, national-religious and Arab – likely affecting culture and beliefs on both sides of the equation.
With respect to the Jewish Diaspora, many Jews were confused and worried even before October 7. The heated debate in Israel regarding the judicial overhaul raised difficult questions about the democratic values of the Jewish state.
October 7 was a total shock. Diaspora Zionist Jews found themselves on the front line of an information war, defending Israel against accusations of genocide and war crimes in Gaza, even as an ugly, massive wave of unprecedented antisemitism swept world capitals.
In Australia, hateful slogans against Jews and Israel were chanted in mass protests in Sydney and Melbourne, legitimising the sentiment that resulted in the Bondi Beach massacre in December 2025.
The winner of the 2026 Israeli elections should take responsibility and engage in a robust consultation process with the leadership of the Jewish Diaspora about their communities’ needs. Reinforcing Israel’s reputation as a democracy would help the next government in the difficult task of improving relations with other countries, including Australia, and contribute to the sense of strength and safety of local Jewish communities.
Every election in Israel is labelled as critically important. But following October 7, these elections may prove to be the most important ever, with significant and direct implications for the Jewish Diaspora, as well as for Israel’s future.
Dr Ran Porat is a research associate at the Australia Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC). He is also a research associate at the Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation at Monash University and a research fellow at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman University in Herzliya.