Three years on, Israel faces a different reality

The October, 7, 2023 Hamas-led attacks from Gaza saw the massacre of over 1200 Israelis and the abduction of 251 hostages. This week marks the third anniversary of the deadliest single massacre of Jews since the Holocaust.

Tal Becker is an experienced Israeli peace negotiator. Becker points out that in the Middle East there are no solutions. What you want to try to do is exchange your current set of problems for a somewhat better set of problems. Are Israel’s current set of problems better than in the three years after 7 October? In many ways, the answer is yes.

Take Israel’s southern borders. Last October I visited kibbutz Kfar Aza, about a kilometre from the Gazan border. Around 250 terrorists invaded the kibbutz on the morning of October 7, 2023. Prior to the massacre, the kibbutz had 950 residents. There were only a handful of residents when I visited. The kibbutz estimates that about 70 per cent of residents will return by the end of 2027. The Gaza front has stabilised. There’s been no rocket fire for a year.

I also visited Israel’s northern border areas with Lebanon. Residents had been evacuated for their safety. Post-October 7 Israel has taken the Hezbollah bull by the horns: Hezbollah has lost all its senior leaders. It’s not defeated, but it is no longer an existential threat. Hezbollah has been pushed far enough from Israel’s border to allow for the resumption of normal life in Israel’s northern border communities. Lebanon has been brought closer to assembling a national plurality that wants to deal itself out of wars with Israel with direct Israel and Lebanon talks taking place.

When it comes to the Iran war and the Persian Gulf it is obviously a mixed bag. Iran’s blockade of Hormuz, the Houthis’ blockade of the Red Sea and Iranian strikes on regional oil infrastructure have increased energy costs for many countries.

The last three years have also witnessed Israel’s increasing international isolation, along with a surge of antisemitism. Many deny the Jewish nation’s right to statehood. Israel has largely lost the hearts and minds game. The record 25-minute standing ovation for the NAZA movie at the Venice film festival says it all. It wasn’t for the film. It was against Israel. But when it comes to international perception and public praise versus survival most Israelis support the uncommon wisdom of former Israeli prime minister Golda Meir, “better a bad press than a good eulogy”. There are also internal challenges for Israel since October 7. Combat reservists are now doing 100 days of reserve duty per year. There are significant social tensions with those serving in the IDF versus the non-serving (ultra-Orthodox).

The Middle East has rejigged its problems for a different set of problems since October 7. Change to Israel’s security doctrine post-October 7 that it won’t hold back saw Israel taking stronger actions against Iran than it would have otherwise. The Trump administration’s appetite for war was undoubtedly affected after witnessing the events of October 7. It laid bare Iran’s axis of terror proxies around Israel and the threat a nuclear Iran would pose to the West as well as the Middle East.

As for the Palestinians and Israel, Hamas’s terror offensive on October 7 ignited a powder keg. This was by design. European-led efforts to fast-track a Palestinian state ignored the inconvenient fact that Palestinians, not only in Gaza, but the West Bank, approved of and welcomed the attack and continue to demand that any statehood must be accompanied by a so-called “right of return”. That would demographically erase Israel with hostile descendants of refugees of the 1948 war against partition.

The tragedy is that the October 7 massacre pushed off the possibility of a Palestinian state into the deep future. The Hamas attacks were launched from Gaza, from which Israel withdrew in 2005, offering the Gazans full autonomy to govern themselves. They exploited this to launch war on Israel. As a result, there’s virtually no chance Israel will make the same mistake by withdrawing from the West Bank. But if there is to be any role for a third-party state here it must be informed and balanced. Virtue signalling and moral grandstanding, while good for domestic politics, are of no value, and even damaging. They are simply dismissed as featherweight nonsense by the parties to the conflict.

For Australia the last three years has seen our relationship with Israel frozen by Albanese’s unbreakable attachment to performative politics. We’re left irrelevant, watching from the sidelines as Israel, now the regional powerhouse, and its Arab neighbours shape a new Middle East without us. Even if there is a change in government after Israel’s election on October 27 it’s doubtful if there would be any change on issues like Hamas and Iran. A new government in Jerusalem would probably not initially seek to reset relations with Australia.

Since October 7 the Albanese government picked a side and sadly it’s not Israel.

Dr Anthony Bergin is an expert associate at the National Security College.