WCK strike: What the record actually shows

The death of aid worker Zomi Frankcom was a terrible tragedy. Our hearts go out to her family and friends for this loss. There is no doubt that she was working in Gaza out of the best of motivations and it was brave of her to willingly serve in a very dangerous war zone. The world can ill afford to lose such people.

There is a shared responsibility for her death. There are the operational mistakes and failed targeting process of the IDF, freely admitted by them and for which they have apologised. Zomi was also let down by the exceptionally poor operational standards of the World Central Kitchen, particularly when compared with the experienced and proven standards adhered to by organisations like the ICRC.

The person assigned to investigate and report on the WCK incident on behalf of the Australian government, with the full cooperation of the IDF, was former CDF Mark Binskin. Binskin has a wealth of high level operational and targeting experience in Iraq, during the initial large scale conventional maneuver operations, and then later in the highly relevant siege of Mosul from October 2016-July 2017, in which the RAAF was closely involved.

His report disclosed that the WCK hired armed guards, which was not cleared with the IDF and which it would not have agreed to. The WCK vehicles were using a route that was different to the one communicated to the IDF. The movement was conducted at night rather than in daylight, which was also contrary to what had been advised to the IDF. One of the WCK guards was observed by the IDF firing into the air. These factors led to the IDF conclusion that the convoy had been hijacked by Hamas.

The WCK vehicles did not carry transponders and radios and were inadequately marked, all in contrast with the ICRC which is an organisation well practiced in working in war zones. The lack of radios was particularly problematic in this instance: the IDF had no way of tactically communicating with WCK. That is inexcusable.

Mike Kelly was seconded from the Australian Army to support the work of the ICRC in Bosnia and became very familiar with what a sound intergovernmental organisation /non- governmental organisation war zone operation should look like. He’s observed on multiple deployments a variety of NGOs, which range from professional and sound field operators, inexcusable laxity and incompetence in high threat environments. In general, they are motivated by good intentions. But as the saying goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The WCK were operating in an ongoing conflict zone unrivalled for its complexity as a multidimensional, 360-degree battlespace. Their operating capability and procedures didn’t adequately provide for that.

Questions also need to be asked about WCK hiring of gunmen. Did they supply the weapons or just accept someone who turned up with their own weapon? If it was the latter then how did they screen to ensure they were not Hamas. If they weren’t Hamas were they from one of the opposition clans to Hamas, in which case WCK will have inadvertently taken sides and risked becoming a target for Hamas apart from its usual looting activities.

The other party bearing responsibility for Zomi’s death is Hamas itself. This terrorist organisation routinely hijacks food convoys to support its own operational model, including prioritising feeding its own combatants, denying food to Gazans who opposed them and using the looted supplies to underpin the black-market economy that funds its operations.

In July the UN Coordinator responsible for Gaza, Ramiz Alakbarov, was forced to issue a public condemnation of Hamas for obstructing aid operations, entering a World Food Programme warehouse, assaulting truck drivers and forcing the shutdown of a food distribution point. He cited a “dangerous pattern of intimidation, violence and obstruction, including smuggling attempts, targeting and abusing humanitarian operations”. He stated that these Hamas actions were, “placing humanitarian workers at risk”.

Apart from starting and perpetuating the war in the first place, this constant looting and compromising of aid activity by Hamas created the circumstances in which the WCK incident was at risk of occurring, particularly when compounded by the poor operational standards of the WCK. For Zomi this toxic mix proved fatal.

Notwithstanding the mistakes made by the IDF and noting the above contributing factors, Binskin found that, “it is my assessment that the IDF strike on the WCK aid workers was not knowingly or deliberately directed against the WCK.” He also highlighted that IDF targeting regimes, battlefield management and investigation procedures were substantially the same as those employed by the ADF.

What needs to be understood here is that military personnel are subject to two disciplinary systems, administrative and criminal. In this case several IDF officers were subjected to administrative discipline. Binskin highlights that this is the appropriate course of action when it is determined criminal proceedings aren’t warranted.

He cites the example of the Kunduz MSF Hospital incident in Afghanistan on 3 Oct 2015 where a US air strike resulted in 42 deaths and which an Australian doctor was fortunate to survive. This was also found to be a mistake and administrative discipline action was taken against those responsible. Australia did not demand a criminal prosecution. As brutal as it sounds, the laws of armed conflict are fundamentally situated in the context of violent war zones where lawful killing is permitted. To establish a war crime in such circumstances is difficult.

The fact that the Israeli Military Advocate General (MAG), in its announcement which included the WCK incident, also authorised two other cases from the war to be further pursued on a criminal basis proves that the system in Israel is working. This should be respected. Imagine if the Afghan Foreign Minister publicly abused the Australian government for the fact that the ADF members against whom 39 murders have been alleged in the Afghanistan conflict should have all been found guilty by now and the delay of 13 years in getting to trial is unacceptable and a cover up. What would we have said to that?

Mark Binskin should be called on again for his expert advice on the findings regarding Zomi Frankom’s death. It appears Israel is open to cooperating again with such a further consultation and if confirmed that offer should be accepted.

 Mike Kelly is an adjunct professor at the National Security Institute, University of Canberra. He is a former army officer with extensive operational experience in Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor and Iraq and a former Labor Minister for Defence Materiel. Anthony Bergin is an expert associate at ANU’s National Security College and a former academic at the ADF Academy.

Also need to add “A version of this article first appeared in The Australian.”

Mike Kelly is a former ADF soldier, Labor government minister and the co-convenor of Labor Friends of Israel. Dr Anthony Bergin is an expert associate at the National Security College. A version of this op-ed appeared in The Australian.